Yossi Alpher
The most striking aspect of current Bush administration policy toward the Israel-Palestine conflict is a sharp contradiction. On the one hand, pressures are being brought to bear on the administration from some quarters in the US and from the Arab world to get more energetically involved. But on the other, the administration has a long list of reasons–some might say excuses–not to do so.
The common denominator connecting these two sides of the issue is the United States’ unprecedented involvement elsewhere in the region. The administration apparently believes that Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Arab democratic reform are of much higher priority than Israel-Palestine and can be dealt with effectively while paying little more than hyped-up lip service to the latter conflict. In any case, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is deemed unsolvable under present circumstances and not worth risking American diplomatic and other resources on. Most of the involved American Jewish community, the American public-at-large and Congress tend to acquiesce in this stance, if not actively support it, even as they attack Bush over his Iraq policies.
In contrast, a sector of the administration’s increasingly vocal critics–from Baker-Hamilton to Jimmy Carter, backed by Arab opinion–argues that Bush’s priorities are skewed, and that he will make little progress dealing with the other conflicts unless and until he gets really deeply involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They point out that, one way or another, Bush needs the moderate Arabs and the Europeans if he is to deal effectively with Iraq and Iran. And the Arabs and Europeans, justifiably or not, want to see progress in the Israeli-Palestinian sphere.
